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The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present
a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack
taking the scheme of Hillery, Buzˇek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59 1829 (1999)] as
an example. By distinguishing between two mixed states, we derive the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which a dishonest participant can attain all the information without introducing
any error, which shows that the HBB protocol is insecure against dishonest participants. It is easy
to verify that the attack scheme of Karlsson, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59, 162 (1999)]
is a special example of our results. To demonstrate our results further, we construct an explicit
attack scheme according to the necessary and sufficient conditions. Our work completes the security
analysis of the HBB protocol, and the method presented may be useful for the analysis of other
similar protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is a technique which permits
parties to communicate over an open channel in a se-
cure way. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is an important
branch of quantum cryptography, which allows a secret to
be shared among many participants in such a way that
only the authorized groups can reconstruct it. In fact,
there are two types in quantum secret sharing, that is,
the sharing of classical secret and that of quantum infor-
mation. The former was first proposed by Hillery, Buzˇek
and Berthiaume [1] (called HBB hereafter), and the lat-
ter was first presented by Cleve, Gottesman and Lo [2].
Since the above pioneering works appeared, QSS has at-
tracted a great deal of attention (please see [3, 4] for the
sharing of classical secret and [5] for that of quantum
information).
As we know, the designing schemes and analyzing
their security are two inherent directions of cryptogra-
phy, which are opposite to but stimulate each other.
Each of them is necessary to the development of cryp-
tography. This is also the case in quantum cryptogra-
phy [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. However, because the theory
of quantum information remains still far from satisfacto-
rily known, the development of quantum cryptanalysis is
relatively slow, especially in QSS. In fact, it is complex
to analyze the security of QSS protocols because multi-
ple participants are involved and not all are honest, and
therefore few results [12, 13, 14] have been obtained.
In this paper, we present a method to analyze the se-
curity of QSS protocols taking the HBB scheme [1] as an
example. The security of HBB has been discussed from
several aspects. Ref. [1] analyzed an intercept-resend at-
tack by a dishonest participant and an entangle-measure
attack by an external attacker. References [12, 13, 14] in-
vestigated the relation between security and the violation
of some Bells inequalities by analyzing several eavesdrop-
ping scenarios. However, their analyses are incomplete
because not all the individual attacks are covered. Ref-
erence [3] showed that the HBB scheme was insecure to
a skillful attack, and gave a remedy; but this analysis
is not systematic. Here, we consider the original HBB
protocol and give a complete and systematic analysis of
security against a participant attack. From our analysis
we also get the same result as Ref. [3], and, moreover,
we derive the necessary and sufficient (NAS) conditions
for a successful attack, which is more important. From
the NAS conditions, we can find many attack schemes
easily (including the eavesdropping strategy in Ref. [3]),
which will deal with the difficulty that breaking a pro-
tocol is unsystematic. Although the result is partly not
new [3], the method (which is indeed our main aim) is.
This method might be useful for the analysis of other
protocols.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we
review the HBB protocol briefly. In Sec. III, we ana-
lyze general participant attack strategies, and derive the
NAS conditions under which a dishonest participant at-
tains the whole secret without introducing any error. In
Sec. IV, we give a simple scheme to achieve the attack
successfully. Finally, we give a conclusion and discussion
in Sec. V. Cumbersome computations and formulas are
summarized in the Appendix.
II. THE HBB PROTOCOL
Let us introduce the principle of the HBB scheme [1]
first. The dealer Alice wants to divide her secret mes-
2TABLE I: Correlations between Alice’s, Bob’s measurement
results and Charlie’s results. Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement
results are listed in the first column (line).
Alice/Bob x+ x− y+ y−
x+ x+ x− y− y+
x− x− x+ y+ y−
y+ y− y+ x− x+
y− y+ y− x+ x−
sage between her two agents, Bob, and Charlie. At the
beginning, Alice prepares a sequence of GHZ triplets in
the state (1/
√
2)(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC, where the subscripts
A, B and C denote the three particles for Alice, Bob and
Charlie, respectively. For each triplet, Alice keeps parti-
cle A and sends particle B to Bob and C to Charlie. As
in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 scheme [15] scheme, all the
three parties choose randomly the measuring basis (MB)
x or y to measure their particles and then they publish
their MBs. The announcement should be done in the
following way: Bob and Charlie both send their MBs to
Alice, who then sends all three MBs to Bob and Char-
lie [16]. Note that no one can learn other’s bases before
having to reveal his, otherwise as pointed out in Ref. [1],
he could cheat more successfully. When the number of
the parties who choose x is odd, the outcomes are use-
ful. Thanks to the features of the GHZ state, Charlie
and Bob can deduce the outcomes of Alice when they
cooperate (see Table I [1]). To check for eavesdropping,
Alice chooses randomly a large subset of the outcomes
to analyze the error rate. That is, Alice requires Bob
and Charlie to announce their outcomes of the samples
in public. If the error rate is lower than a threshold value,
they keep the remaining outcomes as secret key.
III. THE ATTACK ON THE HBB PROTOCOL
Now let us give a complete discussion of the security
of the HBB scheme. As pointed out in Refs. [17, 18, 19],
a participant generally has more advantages in an at-
tack than an outside eavesdropper in the secret-sharing
protocols. If a QSS protocol is secure for a dishonest
participant, it is secure for any eavesdropper. Therefore,
to analyze the security, we should concentrate our atten-
tion on participant attack. Without loss of generality,
we assume the attacker is Charlie, denoted Charlie*. He
seeks to learn Alice’s secret himself without introducing
any error during the eavesdropping check. In order to
take advantage of Alice’s and Bob’s delayed information
about their MBs, a wise attack strategy for Charlie* is
as follows. When the qubits B and C are sent out by Al-
ice, he lets an ancilla, initially in some state |χ〉, interact
unitarily with them (the dimensionality of the ancilla is
a free variable which causes no loss in generality). After
the interaction, Charlie* sends qubit B to Bob, stores
qubit C and his ancilla until Alice announces the MBs
used by the three parties. Finally, Charlie* measures the
qubits at his site to achieve the secret according to Alice’s
announcements.
We now describe the procedure in detail. After Alice
sends out the two qubits, B and C, Charlie* intercepts
them and they interacts with his ancilla. After that, the
state of the whole system may be written as
|Ψ〉ABCE =
1∑
i,j=0
aij |ij〉AB|εij〉CE , (1)
where |εij〉 refers to the state of Charlie* after the in-
teraction and is normalized, and aij is complex number
that satisfies
1∑
i,j=0
|aij |2 = 1. (2)
A. The conditions to escape detection
As mentioned above, to use the information about
Alice’s and Bob’s MBs, Charlie* does not measure his
qubits until Alice reveals them, and then he can choose
different methods accordingly. Note that when Alice re-
quires Charlie* to declare his MBs, Charlie* generates a
random sequence of x and y to forge his MBs, actually he
does not measure any qubit. If the MBs chosen by all the
three parties satisfy the condition that the number of x
is odd, the results are kept, otherwise they are discarded.
Therefore Charlie* knows Alice’s and Bob’s MBs for ev-
ery useful triplet which can be utilized in the subsequent
steps. When some triplets are chosen by Alice to detect
eavesdropping, Charlie* then measures his corresponding
qubits and announces outcomes according to Alice’s and
Bob’s MBs. Now we explore the conditions they must be
satisfied if Charlie* wants to escape from being detected.
Let us first consider the case where both Alice and Bob
measure their qubits in x direction, and of course, Char-
lie* declares x. The state of the whole system |Ψ〉ABCE
can be rewritten as
3|Ψ〉ABCE = 1
2
[ |x+〉A|x+〉B(a00|ε00〉+ a01|ε01〉+ a10|ε10〉+ a11|ε11〉)CE
+ |x+〉A|x−〉B(a00|ε00〉 − a01|ε01〉+ a10|ε10〉 − a11|ε11〉)CE (3)
+ |x−〉A|x+〉B(a00|ε00〉+ a01|ε01〉 − a10|ε10〉 − a11|ε11〉)CE
+ |x−〉A|x−〉B(a00|ε00〉 − a01|ε01〉 − a10|ε10〉+ a11|ε11〉)CE ].
We can see from Table I that without eavesdropping,
if Alice’s and Bob’s results are x+x+ or x−x−, Char-
lie*’s announcement should be x+, otherwise, his an-
nouncement should be x−. In a convenient depiction,
we denote Charlie*’s state as |ϕjmkn〉 which is normal-
ized, when Alice’s and Bob’s results are jm and kn, where
j, k ∈ {x, y} and m,n ∈ {+,−}. To avoid being found
out, Charlie* should have the ability to discriminate
completely between the two sets {|ϕx+x+〉, |ϕx−x−〉},
{|ϕx+x−〉, |ϕx−x+〉}. As shown in Ref. [20], two sets S1,
S2 can be perfectly discriminated if and only if the sub-
spaces they span are orthogonal. So the scalar products
of Charlie*’s states have to satisfy four constraints:


〈ϕx+x+ |ϕx+x−〉 = 0,
〈ϕx+x+ |ϕx−x+〉 = 0,
〈ϕx−x− |ϕx+x−〉 = 0,
〈ϕx−x− |ϕx−x+〉 = 0.
(4)
From Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain


a∗00a01〈ε00|ε01〉 − a∗11a10〈ε11|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗00a10〈ε00|ε10〉 − a∗11a01〈ε11|ε01〉 = 0,
|a01|2 − a∗01a10〈ε01|ε10〉+ a∗10a01〈ε10|ε01〉 − |a10|2 = 0,
|a00|2 − a∗00a11〈ε00|ε11〉+ a∗11a00〈ε11|ε00〉 − |a11|2 = 0.
(5)
Similarly, the constraints are then found in the Appendix
for other cases. Finally, we obtain results from Eqs. (5),
(A.3), (A.6) and (A.9) :


a∗00a01〈ε00|ε01〉 = a∗00a10〈ε00|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗00a11〈ε00|ε11〉 = a∗01a10〈ε01|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗01a11〈ε01|ε11〉 = a∗10a11〈ε10|ε11〉 = 0,
|a00| = |a11|,
|a01| = |a10|.
(6)
Obviously, Charlie* can succeed in escaping detection by
Alice and Bob when his operations satisfy Eq. (6).
B. The maximum information the attacker can
attain
After escaping from detection, Charlie* measures
the remaining qubits to deduce Alice’s secret. Now
let us compute the maximum information that Char-
lie* can gain. From Eqs. (3) and (6), we can see
if Alice’s result is x+, Charlie*’s state collapses to
|ϕx+x+〉 or |ϕx+x−〉 with equal probability, otherwise
collapses to |ϕx−x+〉 or |ϕx−x−〉 with equal probabil-
ity. So to get information of Alice’s result, x+ or
x−, Charlie* should distinguish between two mixed
states ρx+ =
1
2
|ϕx+x+〉〈ϕx+x+ | + 12 |ϕx+x−〉〈ϕx+x− | and
ρx− =
1
2
|ϕx−x+〉〈ϕx−x+ | + 12 |ϕx−x−〉〈ϕx−x− | occurring
with equal a priori probability. Generally, there are two
ways to discriminate between two states, minimum er-
ror discrimination and unambiguous discrimination. In
Ref. [21], the authors showed the minimum failure prob-
ability QF attainable in unambiguous discrimination is
always at least twice as large as the minimum-error
probability PE in ambiguous discrimination for two ar-
bitrary mixed quantum states. So we should take the
ambiguous discrimination to get the maximum informa-
tion. Utilizing the well-known result [22]that to dis-
criminate between two mixed states ρ1 and ρ2 occurring
with a priori probabilities p1 and p2, respectively, where
p1 + p2 = 1, the minimum-error probability attainable is
PE =
1
2
− 1
2
‖p2ρ2 − p1ρ1‖, where ‖Λ‖ =Tr
√
Λ†Λ, we get
the minimum-error probability to discriminate between
ρx+ and ρx− under the constraints of Eq. (6)
PE =
1
2
(1− 4|a00| · |a10|). (7)
Considering the other three cases (see the Appendix A)
with similar strategy, we get the same results as Eq. (7).
The mutual information between Alice and Charlie* in
terms of Shannon entropy is given by
IAC = 1 + PE logPE + (1− PE) log(1− PE). (8)
Now the task is maximizing IAC with the constraints of
Eqs. (2) and (6). Using the Lagrange multiplier method,
we attain the maximum IACmax = 1 under conditions


〈ε00|ε01〉 = 〈ε00|ε10〉 = 〈ε00|ε11〉 = 0,
〈ε01|ε10〉 = 〈ε01|ε11〉 = 〈ε10|ε11〉 = 0,
|a00| = |a01| = |a10| = |a11| = 12 .
(9)
Now, we have the NAS conditions for a dishonest par-
ticipant to attack HBB successfully. Therefore the HBB
protocol is insecure (in its original form). Obviously,
|ε00〉, |ε01〉, |ε10〉, and |ε11〉 are orthogonal to each other,
which indicates that a dishonest participant need pre-
pare one additive qubit at least. It is easy to verify that
the eavesdropping strategy in Ref. [3] is a special exam-
ple of our results, where two additive qubits are used and
a00|ε00〉 = 12 |000〉, a01|ε01〉 = − 12 |001〉, a10|ε10〉 = 12 |110〉,
and a11|ε11〉 = − 12 |111〉.
4H
Ψ0 Ψ1
E = |0〉
C
B
A
FIG. 1: Quantum circuit representing the interaction of Char-
lie*’s ancilla E, with qubits B, C.
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACK
According to Eq. (9), we can construct some attack
schemes easily. Here we give an even simpler scheme
than Ref. [3] with only one additive qubit. Generally, the
ancilla is the standard state |0〉. We choose a00|ε00〉 =
1
2
|00〉, a01|ε01〉 = 12 |01〉, a10|ε10〉 = 12 |10〉, and a11|ε11〉 =
− 1
2
|11〉 which satisfy Eq. (9). Comparing the initial
state with the state after interaction (see Eq. (1)), we
can derive the operations performed by Charlie*.
Now we describe the attack orderly. Charlie* prepares
the ancilla E in state |0〉. After Alice sends out two
qubits B and C, Charlie* intercepts them, performs H =
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈1|)/√2 on the qubit B and
CNOT operation on B, E (see Fig. 1). The entangled
state of Alice, Bob and Charlie* is converted from |Ψ0〉 =
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC ⊗ |0〉E to
|Ψ1〉 = 1
2
(|00〉AB|00〉CE + |01〉AB|01〉CE (10)
+|10〉AB|10〉CE − |11〉AB|11〉CE).
After Alice and Bob measure their qubits, the whole sys-
tem is changed into |Ψ2〉 (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) which
varies according to their MBs. Let us describe all the
cases in detail.
(i) If both Alice’s and Bob’s MBs are x, Charlie*’s
state collapses to one of the four results
|ϕx+x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)CE ,
|ϕx+x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)CE , (11)
|ϕx−x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉)CE ,
|ϕx−x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉)CE.
(ii) When Alice and Bob measure their qubits in x, y
basis, respectively, Charlie*’s state may be one of the
W
V
U
Ψ1 Ψ2
E
C
B
A
Alice’s, Bob’s Operations Charlie*’ Operations
{ {
FIG. 2: Quantum circuit on the detection qubits. Here U , V ,
W∈ {H,SH}, and S = |0〉〈0| + i|1〉〈1|. The ‘meter’ symbol
denotes a projective measurement in the computational basis
z. H (SH) can transform z basis into x (y) basis. Charlie*
performs his operations according to the MBs of Alice and
Bob to avoid being detected.
four states
|ϕx+y+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − i|01〉+ |10〉+ i|11〉)CE,
|ϕx+y−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ i|01〉+ |10〉 − i|11〉)CE, (12)
|ϕx−y+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − i|01〉 − |10〉 − i|11〉)CE,
|ϕx−y−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ i|01〉 − |10〉+ i|11〉)CE.
(iii) When Alice and Bob measure their qubits in y, x
basis, respectively, Charlie*’s state may be one of the
four states
|ϕy+x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉 − i|10〉+ i|11〉)CE,
|ϕy+x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − i|10〉 − i|11〉)CE, (13)
|ϕy−x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ i|10〉 − i|11〉)CE,
|ϕy−x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉+ i|10〉+ i|11〉)CE.
(iv) When Alice’s and Bob’s MBs are y, Charlie*’s state
collapses to one of the four results
|ϕy+y+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − i|01〉 − i|10〉+ |11〉)CE,
|ϕy+y−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ i|01〉 − i|10〉 − |11〉)CE, (14)
|ϕy−y+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − i|01〉+ i|10〉 − |11〉)CE,
|ϕy−y−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ i|01〉+ i|10〉+ |11〉)CE.
It is easy to validate that the four states are orthogo-
nal to each other in every case, which implies that they
can be distinguished perfectly. Consequently, Charlie*
can not only get the secret of Alice but also escape from
5U
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A
FIG. 3: Quantum circuit on the information qubits. After
Alice and Bob measure their qubits, Charlie* measures qubit
C in the same basis as Alice, and qubit E in computational
basis. He can deduce Alice’s results from his measurement
outcomes.
detection. In fact, we only need distinguish between two
different results because the qubits are used to either de-
tect eavesdropping or distill information. Therefore there
are some simple ways to fulfill Charlie*’s objective.
We take case (i) as an example to describe Charlie*’s
operations. Let us first explain how Charlie* can escape
from being detected when the qubits are chosen to check
eavesdropping. Charlie* wants to deduce his proper dec-
laration x+ or x−; therefore, he need discriminate be-
tween {|ϕx+x+〉, |ϕx−x−〉} and {|ϕx+x−〉, |ϕx−x+〉}. A
particularly simple circuit to achieve this task is illus-
trated in Fig. 2 (Here U = V = W = H). Concretely,
after the operations of CNOT and W, the four states in
Eq. (11) are converted into
|ϕx+x+〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)CE ,
|ϕx+x−〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)CE , (15)
|ϕx−x+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CE ,
|ϕx−x−〉 =
1√
2
(−|01〉+ |10〉)CE .
Then Charlie* measures each qubit in computational ba-
sis. If the measurement results of C, E are 00 or 11,
Charlie*’s announcement is 1 (corresponding to |1〉, |x−〉
or |y−〉 hereafter), otherwise his announcement is 0 (cor-
responding to |0〉, |x+〉 or |y+〉 hereafter). According to
Table I, we can see no error occurs, and therefore Char-
lie* can escape from being detected.
We now discuss how Charlie* can obtain the secret
information from his qubits. He only needs distinguish
between {|ϕx+x+〉, |ϕx+x−〉} and {|ϕx−x+〉, |ϕx−x−〉} to
get Alice’s secret x+ or x−. The circuit to achieve this
task is illustrated in Fig. 3. After the U operation, the
TABLE II: The unitary operators for U , V , W in different
cases.
i ii iii iv
U H H SH SH
V H SH H SH
W H SH SH H
TABLE III: Relations between Charlie*’s measurement re-
sults and his announcements (the first column) for the detec-
tion qubits.
i ii iii iv
0 10, 01 10, 11 10, 01 10, 11
1 00, 11 00, 01 00, 11 00, 01
states in Eq. (11) are changed into
|ϕx+x+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CE ,
|ϕx+x−〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)CE , (16)
|ϕx−x+〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)CE ,
|ϕx−x−〉 =
1√
2
(−|01〉+ |10〉)CE .
From Eq. (16), we can see clearly that the measurement
results, 01 or 10, imply that Alice’s secret is x−, and 00
or 11 indicate x+.
For other cases (ii), (iii) and (iv), Charlie* can also
distinguish between the corresponding states by choosing
different U and W according to Table II, avoid being
detected by announcing his results according to Table III
and then deduce Alice’s secret according to Table IV.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The object of QSS protocols is to transmit a secret in
such a way that only the authorized groups can access
it, and no other combination of parties can get any in-
formation about it. The worst case for QSS protocols
is that some participants are dishonest, and try to find
the secret by themselves. Therefore, participant attack is
the most serious threat for the security of QSS protocols,
and that is exactly what we study. The purpose of this
TABLE IV: Relations between Charlie*’s measurement re-
sults and Alice’s secret (the first column) for the information
qubits.
i ii iii iv
0 00, 11 00, 11 10, 01 10, 01
1 10, 01 10, 01 00, 11 00, 11
6paper is to give a method to analyze a participant at-
tack in QSS. We introduce this method taking the HBB
scheme [1] as an example. A dishonest participant inter-
cepts all the qubits, they interact with his ancilla, and
he then resends them out. He then measures his qubits
after other participants reveal their useful information.
By discriminating between two mixed states, we obtain
the NAS conditions under which the dishonest partici-
pant can attain all the information without introducing
any error. This result shows that the HBB protocol is in-
secure (in its original form). Finally, we give an example
achieving the proposed attack to demonstrate our results
further.
Although the result that the HBB scheme is insecure
(in its original form) is not new, the method of analyz-
ing the participant attack is, to our knowledge. The
treatment we have presented appears to cover all indi-
vidual participant attacks allowed by physical laws. This
method can be applied to other similar QSS protocols
with some modifications. We believe that this method
would be useful in designing related schemes and analyz-
ing their security. On the one hand, we can construct
attack strategies easily according to the NAS conditions
when a protocol has security loopholes. On the other
hand, we can show that protocol is secure if the attack
conditions cannot be reached. For example, applying this
method to the enhanced protocol [3], we can show it is
secure (Such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper).
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APPENDIX A: CONSTRAINTS ON CHARLIE*’S
PROBES
In this appendix, we find the conditions which Char-
lie*’s operations need satisfy when no errors are to occur
in the procedure of detection in other three cases.
(1) When Alice, Bob and Charlie* choose the MBs
x, y, y respectively, the whole system |Ψ〉ABCE can be
rewritten as
|Ψ〉ABCE =
1
2
[|x+y+〉(a00|ε00〉 − ia01|ε01〉+ a10|ε10〉 − ia11|ε11〉)
+|x+y−〉(a00|ε00〉+ ia01|ε01〉+ a10|ε10〉+ ia11|ε11〉)
+|x−y+〉(a00|ε00〉 − ia01|ε01〉 − a10|ε10〉+ ia11|ε11〉)
+|x−y−〉(a00|ε00〉+ ia01|ε01〉 − a10|ε10〉 − ia11|ε11〉)].
(A1)
According to Table I, when Alice’s and Bob’s results are
x+y+ or x−y−, Charlie*’s announcement should be y−,
otherwise, his announcement should be y+. Therefore,
Charlie* should be capable of distinguishing between the
two sets, {|ϕx+y+〉, |ϕx−y−〉} and {|ϕx+y−〉, |ϕx−y+〉}, to
avoid being detected. That is


〈ϕx+y+ |ϕx+y−〉 = 0,
〈ϕx+y+ |ϕx−y+〉 = 0,
〈ϕx−y− |ϕx+y−〉 = 0,
〈ϕx−y− |ϕx−y+〉 = 0.
(A2)
Then we get
a∗00a01〈ε00|ε01〉+ a∗11a10〈ε11|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗00a10〈ε00|ε10〉 − a∗11a01〈ε11|ε01〉 = 0, (A3)
|a01|2 − ia∗01a10〈ε01|ε10〉 − ia∗10a01〈ε10|ε01〉 − |a10|2 = 0,
|a00|2 + ia∗00a11〈ε00|ε11〉+ ia∗11a00〈ε11|ε00〉 − |a11|2 = 0.
(2) When Alice, Bob and Charlie* choose the MBs y, x,
y, respectively, |Ψ〉ABCE can be rewritten as
|Ψ〉ABCE =
1
2
[|y+x+〉(a00|ε00〉+ a01|ε01〉 − ia10|ε10〉 − ia11|ε11〉)
+|y+x−〉(a00|ε00〉 − a01|ε01〉 − ia10|ε10〉+ ia11|ε11〉)
+|y−x+〉(a00|ε00〉+ a01|ε01〉+ ia10|ε10〉+ ia11|ε11〉)
+|y−x−〉(a00|ε00〉 − a01|ε01〉+ ia10|ε10〉 − ia11|ε11〉)].
(A4)
According to Table I, the results, y+x+ or y−x−, imply
Charlie*’s announcement should be y−, and others imply
y+. For the same reason, we let


〈ϕy+x+ |ϕy+x−〉 = 0,
〈ϕy+x+ |ϕy−x+〉 = 0,
〈ϕy−x− |ϕy+x−〉 = 0,
〈ϕy−x− |ϕy−x+〉 = 0.
(A5)
We then have
a∗00a01〈ε00|ε01〉 − a∗11a10〈ε11|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗00a10〈ε00|ε10〉+ a∗11a01〈ε11|ε01〉 = 0,
|a01|2 + ia∗01a10〈ε01|ε10〉+ ia∗10a01〈ε10|ε01〉 − |a10|2 = 0,
|a00|2 + ia∗00a11〈ε00|ε11〉+ ia∗11a00〈ε11|ε00〉 − |a11|2 = 0.
(A6)
7(3) When Alice, Bob and Charlie* choose the MBs y,
y, x, respectively, |Ψ〉ABCE can be rewritten as
|Ψ〉ABCE =
1
2
[|y+y+〉(a00|ε00〉 − ia01|ε01〉 − ia10|ε10〉 − a11|ε11〉)
+|y+y−〉(a00|ε00〉+ ia01|ε01〉 − ia10|ε10〉+ a11|ε11〉)
+|y−y+〉(a00|ε00〉 − ia01|ε01〉+ ia10|ε10〉+ a11|ε11〉)
+|y−y−〉(a00|ε00〉+ ia01|ε01〉+ ia10|ε10〉 − a11|ε11〉)].
(A7)
The results, y+y+ or y−y−, imply Charlie*’s announce-
ment should be x−, and others imply x+. For the same
reason, we let


〈ϕy+y+ |ϕy+y−〉 = 0,
〈ϕy+y+ |ϕy−y+〉 = 0,
〈ϕy−y− |ϕy+y−〉 = 0,
〈ϕy−y− |ϕy−y+〉 = 0.
(A8)
We then have
a∗00a01〈ε00|ε01〉+ a∗11a10〈ε11|ε10〉 = 0,
a∗00a10〈ε00|ε10〉+ a∗11a01〈ε11|ε01〉 = 0, (A9)
|a01|2 − a∗01a10〈ε01|ε10〉+ a∗10a01〈ε10|ε01〉 − |a10|2 = 0,
|a00|2 + a∗00a11〈ε00|ε11〉 − a∗11a00〈ε11|ε00〉 − |a11|2 = 0.
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